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The labor movement in the United States is in trouble. This 
fact is now widely accepted even by leaders of the AFL-CIO. It is 
also generally agreed that loss of membership and failure to organ- 
ize are the most powerful indications of the movement's decline. 
One of the few bright spots from the perspective of a union sup- 
porter is that labor seems finally to have rediscovered the crucial 
significance of organizing. The recently concluded AFL-CIO con- 
vention was largely devoted to organizing manifestos and plans.' 
Despite this awakening there is still disagreement and confusion 
about the causes or cures for labor's organizing setbacks. The offi- 
cial view held by a majority of labor leaders is that organizing fail- 
ures are largely attributable to the changing workforce and to man- 
agement's increasing use of sophisticated union-busting techniques 
without interference by the currently anti-labor National Labor 
Relations Board. The trend could be reversed by reforming labor 
law, or by changing the membership of the Board. Short of that, 
unions must appeal to the employees' self-interest by becoming di- 
rect providers of economic benefits, and by promising that union 
benefits will continue regardless of the waning power of the labor 
movement.2 This view is a comfortable one for organized labor be- 
cause it locates the causes of labor's difficulties outside the unions' 
areas of control and responsibility. 
There is a minority view, however, which holds that labor's 
t William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. 
During the winter and spring of 1971, I was a Visiting Professor at the University of 
Chicago Law School. One of the great and lasting pleasures of that visit was getting to know 
Bernie Meltzer. He is a friendly, gracious, and learned man with whom discussion is both 
enlightening and enjoyable. He has helped to make and keep the University of Chicago Law 
School the great institution it is, not only by his own outstanding work, but also by in- 
structing and stimulating his colleagues. 
I See AFL-CIO News, Nov. 19, 1985, at 1-4. 
2 Since changes in law or policy are virtually impossible in the present anti-union polit- 
ical climate, the majority view tacitly admits that unions are not likely to win major conces- 
sions from employers in the near future. One response is the recently approved plan to offer 
associate membership along with insurance and other work-related benefits to employees 
not represented by unions in collective bargaining. See id. at 1, col. 2. 
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organizing failures have occurred because unions have been com- 
placent, have lost their sense of mission, have assigned incompe- 
tent people to organizing, and have failed to adopt innovative or- 
ganizing tactics in response to changing conditions.3 They have not 
convinced the employees that unions represent he best pathway 
to needed change and increased dignity. Holders of this view be- 
lieve that the political makeup of the Board is unimportant and 
that reform of the labor movement should be the unions' primary 
concern. 
This article explains why those of us who hold the second view 
believe that the key to success for unions lies in the revitalization 
of the organizing process and in the careful selection and training 
of organizers. It also suggests that government regulation of the 
organizing process, particularly the extensive regulation of em- 
ployer speech, has not been helpful to the labor movement. 
The views explicated in this article have been developed 
through traditional academic study, a major field research project 
during which I interviewed hundreds of employees, formal and in- 
formal discussions with management and union officials, and re- 
search into the successful organizing drive conducted among cleri- 
cal and technical workers at Yale University by Local 34 of the 
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE). I un- 
dertook to study the HERE effort at Yale in a scholarly way be- 
cause, as an involved faculty member, I was struck by how differ- 
ent their approach was from typical union organizing efforts I had 
studied. Their organizers were more engaged with the employees, 
their tactics more imaginative, the rank and file more involved, 
and the spirit of union solidarity more evident. It did not surprise 
me to learn that HERE in New England was thriving-winning 
elections and adding members-while the union movement gener- 
ally was suffering reverses.4 
My interviews with the leadership of Local 34 disclosed that 
the approach they used was based on insights originally developed 
by Vincent Sirabella, currently Director of Organizing for HERE's 
international union. Sirabella has been a union activist for almost 
forty years. During all that time he has been both a thoroughly 
I See, e.g., Baptiste, Modern Union Organizing Techniques and the Future of Collec- 
tive Bargaining, 15 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming Fall, 1985); V. Sirabella, Organizing in the 
80's: Address before the Labor Conference on Organizing in the 80's, The New York School 
of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University 3 (Jan. 12, 1985) (on file with The 
University of Chicago Law Review). 
4 During the period from 1979 to 1985, the union won 11 consecutive Board elections, 
the last of which involved Morry's Restaurant in New Haven. 
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dedicated trade-unionist and a critic of the movement's leadership. 
Sirabella advocates unions based on rank and file involvement and 
control, and professional organizers recruited on the basis of zeal, 
ability, and social commitment. He has been willing to seek and 
train as organizers people who come from outside the ranks of or- 
ganized labor. His first and most notable protege is John Wilhelm, 
the person who led the Yale drive and who was chief negotiator for 
the union thereafter. In the course of preparing this article I have 
had the chance to speak at length about union organizing with 
both Wilhelm and Sirabella5 and to study a document that 
Sirabella wrote for an AFL-CIO conference on organizing.6 The 
discussion that follows is based on all of the sources, scientific and 
impressionistic, described above. 
I. WHAT HAPPENS IN UNION ORGANIZING 
A. The Union Start-Up Campaign 
Organizing drives arise out of discontent, often coupled with 
anxiety about changes in the enterprise.7 Employees who feel un- 
fairly treated, inadequately compensated, and subject to arbitrary 
change will often be responsive to union overtures. Frequently they 
will themselves contact an organizer. 
The central idea of unions is and always has been the aggrega- 
tion of employee power. The basic message is that the employees 
united will be far more powerful than they have been in dealing 
with the employer on an individual basis. Large unions like the 
Teamsters and the UAW promise not only the power of the em- 
ployees in the unit but the power, wealth, and resources of huge 
organizations. This is one reason why employees thinking about or- 
ganizing often contact the Teamsters despite their unsavory 
reputation. 
5 These interviews were conducted largely in the spring of 1985, and were taped and 
transcribed. Transcripts are on file with the author. 
6 V. Sirabella, supra note 3. I have also discussed the dynamics of organizing cam- 
paigns at considerable length with Leland Cross, Esq., of the firm Ice Miller Donadio & 
Ryan, which represents management on a regular basis. One of the things that have in- 
trigued and influenced me is the fact that this successful management lawyer and this suc- 
cessful union organizer have strikingly similar views on campaign dynamics. 
7 See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW 
AND REALITY 142 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LAW & REALITY]. The description of campaigns, 
and the quotations used to typify them, are drawn from the materials we collected as part of 
our study. Some of this material has also been published in J. GETMAN & J. BLACKBURN, 
LABOR RELATIONS: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 75-85 (1983) [hereinafter cited as LABOR 
RELATIONS]. 
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An organizer who has decided that the prospect of success is 
sufficient towarrant an organizing effort will establish an organiz- 
ing committee made up of employees, one function of which will be 
to persuade the workers to sign authorization cards designating the 
union as their collective bargaining agent. In order to convince m- 
ployees to sign up, the union and its supporters will stress not only 
the prospect of improved wages and working conditions, but also 
the dignity that comes from having contractually-defined rights 
enforced through a meaningful grievance process and the fairness 
of using seniority as a technique for establishing priorities. Often 
union organizers will ask the employees about the changes they 
would like to see and then show them contracts from other bar- 
gaining units that have achieved these improvements. This is a 
powerful message to which very few discontented employees are 
totally immune. Where discontent is widespread, a high percentage 
of employees will often sign up fairly quickly.8 
Accordingly, it is common for the first part of an organizing 
drive to be deceptively successful. In smaller units a majority will 
sometimes ign authorization cards before the employer knows 
that the campaign is underway or has a chance to respond.9 At this 
point it is almost always the case that a majority of employees wish 
to be represented, although the degree to which the employees 
support the union varies. Some are enthusiastic, life-long union 
supporters; others know little about unions. Some start from a 
questioning attitude, and some are hoping that the organizing 
drive will convince the employer to improve wages and working 
conditions in order to forestall unionization. 
If the organizing effort is successful, the union organizer will 
write a "recognition letter" to the company's chief executive officer 
advising that the union has signed up a majority of employees, of- 
fering to prove this to an impartial observer, and requesting the 
company to enter immediately into a bargaining relationship with 
the union. The employer may respond to the request for recogni- 
tion by entering into immediate collective bargaining with the 
union. Such action is legal if the union in fact represents an un- 
coerced majority at the time. But immediate bargaining is rare: 
8 Most unions do not collect dues from employees who sign up during this period. The 
prospect of paying dues to a union not currently capable of bargaining on their behalf might 
discourage some employees from joining. Moreover, union dues are certain to be a focus of 
the employer's anti-union campaign, and most organizers feel that the impact of this tactic 
can be lessened by waiving all dues until a collective agreement is signed. See R. WILLIAMS, 
P. JANUS & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 127-33 (1974). 
9 See LAW & REALITY, supra note 7, at 135. 
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most employers trongly desire to avoid dealing with a union, and 
they have a right to insist upon an election.'0 
If its request for recognition is rejected, the union's response is 
to file an election petition with the NLRB. The union's petition 
will specify which employees it claims to represent. The employer 
may then challenge the petition by arguing that the unit described 
is inappropriate under Board standards." The terms of the elec- 
tion and questions of eligibility are typically worked out by agree- 
ment of the parties. Usually it is the union that makes major con- 
cessions in order to forestall a Board hearing on these matters, 
since delay is thought o work in the employer's favor.'2 
B. The Employer's Formal Election Campaign 
Employer campaigns are usually directed by a labor relations 
professional, either an attorney or a management consultant. The 
themes struck in the formal campaigns are remarkably similar 
across elections. To the union's basic message of change through 
solidarity, the employer's response is that things are not so bad 
now and that they could easily get worse with the selection of the 
union. The argument hat things are not so bad is a staple of all 
management campaigns even when wages and working conditions 
are poor. Some variation of the following speech is almost always 
used. "In the past, the company has given you all the wage in- 
creases and fringe benefits it could afford and still stay competi- 
tive. We have given you these things voluntarily and without your 
having to pay one cent to any outsider or having to strike. We have 
done this because we want this to be as good a place for you to 
work as this company's financial ability and business will permit us 
10 See Linden Lumber v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1974). 
11 The employer's challenge is typically based on one of several tactical considerations. 
The employer might seek to reduce the number of people in the unit to weaken the union's 
bargaining power if it is successful. The employer might try to alter the unit (usually by 
enlarging it) so as to minimize the union's chances of winning the representation election. 
The employer might also raise issues about the bargaining unit in order to delay the election 
to gain more time to convince the employees to vote against the union. Finally, the parties 
might also disagree about which employees are eligible to vote in a given unit. 
12 The Yale drive was an exception in this regard. During the Yale drive, the union 
anticipated that the administration's lawyers would try to delay the election by litigating 
unit questions at length, which they in fact tried to do. The union responded by bringing 
busloads of employees to the hearings and then issuing flyers in which these employees 
protested what they perceived as the administration's shameful stalling. The tactic worked 
so well that after about two weeks the administration agreed to a unit quite favorable to the 
union. 
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to do."''3 An implicit part of this argument is that the financial 
interests of the employees are inevitably tied to the employer's 
profitability. The union does not realize this and thus endangers 
both the employer and the employees. As one employer speech put 
it, "We are not ashamed of being interested in profits. After all, if 
it wasn't for profits, there would be no reason for us to stay in 
business or provide jobs for you."''4 If wages are low and working 
conditions poor, the company will stress job security or the fact 
that management was willing to do small favors for employees, 
such as giving them time off in emergencies, loaning them money, 
or permitting them to exchange shifts. The employer will claim 
that such behavior will become impossible once a union is on the 
scene and a collective agreement in force.'6 
Employers argue that wages and working conditions will not 
be improved by collective bargaining. The theme that "the union 
can guarantee nothing" is always raised: employers point out that 
the law does not require them to agree to the union's proposals.'6 
It is common for employers to announce that they intend to bar- 
gain tough7 -that if the union insists upon trying to make major 
changes, the result will be a strike which will have awful conse- 
quences for the employees. Almost all campaigns include an argu- 
ment like the following: "Strikes are a brutal and unpleasant 
experience. You get no wages, no unemployment compensation, 
and new employees may be hired to permanently replace you. 
Strikes generate ill will. Violence is not uncommon. . . . Manage- 
ment loses during a strike too. In a strike everyone loses, except 
13 LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 7, at 77-78. 
14 Id. at 80. 
15 The following excerpt from a speech by a professional management consultant is 
typical of this argument: "Now this shop has a lot of women. Many of you girls are the sole 
support of your family; you've got children, you do the best you can to get a babysitter, but 
sometimes things go wrong. And I resent deeply to be bound by a union contract hat says 
when somebody exceeds a limit of, say five days a year, I've got to let her go regardless of 
the reason she was out. That's no heart! When we lose sight of the fact that a company 
exists to serve people we're in trouble!" Id. at 78. 
16 Some employers will distribute "guarantee letters" that contain a series of promises 
purporting to come from the union about the gains they will achieve. On the bottom is a 
space for the organizer's signature. It is assumed that the organizer's refusal to sign demon- 
strates the union's powerlessness. 
17 A speech like this one might be used: "The only way a union can attempt o force 
your company to meet unrealistic union demands would be to pull you out on strike. Now 
without intending to seem harsh or abrupt, I hope you will realize and understand-while 
there is yet time-that we have no intention of yielding to any such pressure as that ever." 
LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 7, at 78. 
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the union organizer. He will draw his pay fifty-two weeks a year."'8 
All employer campaigns suggest that the advent of the union 
might harm employees economically."' Employers almost always 
seek to place the responsibility for such harm on the union, even 
when the employer's response to the union is part of the described 
course of events. Not all employer statements make it clear that 
the harm will result from factors beyond the employer's control.20 
Some leave the source of the harm somewhat ambiguous, and 
others either suggest or announce that the employer will take re- 
prisals against the employees if they vote for the union. Some em- 
ployers go even further and actually take reprisals against union 
supporters during the course of the campaign in order to add to 
the employees' fear of the consequences of unionization. 
Even when the employer conducts an aggressive campaign 
that includes reprisals and threats to "bargain tough," it is com- 
mon for the campaign literature to take a friendly tone, using first 
names on salutations and closings as if to demonstrate the em- 
ployer's other, more humane, side. Frequently the literature will 
purport o correct factual errors in the union's campaign or to con- 
vey information about the election process in a disinterested fash- 
ion. Such propaganda may be labeled a "fact sheet" or "informa- 
tion bulletin" to contrast it with "irresponsible" union claims.2' 
A significant part of almost all management campaigns is the 
18 Id. at 78-79. 
19 Generally a variation of the following argument stated by a manufacturer ofindus- 
trial seats is used: "Our company is the sole supplier that many of these customers have. 
What do you think these customers would do if we became unionized? They would buy half 
as many seats from us as they are now and obviously this would reduce our business and it 
would reduce our employment." Id. at 80. 
20 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (requiring that employer 
statements, to be protected under ? 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
? 158(c) (1982), make clear that the economic onsequences they describe are beyond the 
employer's control). 
21 Sometimes the literature will take the form of responses to fictitious employee 
questions: 
Dear Ed: I would like to share with you some of the typical questions we have 
heard from our employees in the past few weeks. 
"Who would be the union leaders and officers, ifthe union wins? . You all know 
the answer to this question by just looking around the plant. Only a very few will profit 
in this regard from this union. 
LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 7, at 81. 
The Yale administration issued "Election Fact Books," complete with footnotes, which 
purported "to answer questions that have been asked about the important issues con- 
fronting anyone who will vote in this election." The questions included "Will I have to go on 
strike?" and "Who controls the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International 
Union, and how does it control its locals?" 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 12:20:53 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
52 The University of Chicago Law Review [53:45 
argument hat the union organizers are outsiders, interested in the 
employees olely as a source of dues and initiation fees.22 Employ- 
ers argue that because the union is run by outsiders who are not 
really interested in the employees, it will inevitably create a less 
friendly and more adversarial relationship between management 
and labor. Because the union leaders have no stake in the com- 
pany, they will be willing to jeopardize its future and the jobs of 
the employees in order to demonstrate their power. The employer 
may agree that unions make sense in other industries or that they 
did a lot of good once, but will argue that they are no longer 
needed and have become too big, rich, and removed from the true 
interests of working people.23 Even if the employer's campaign de- 
nies general anti-union bias, it will often include an attack on the 
union conducting the organizing drive as particularly corrupt, 
strike-prone, inappropriate for the employees, or insensitive to 
their needs. 
Another important part of almost all employers' campaigns is 
the message that they are sensitive to the concerns which led the 
employees to consider unionizing and that, given a chance, they 
will improve things on their own.24 They will suggest hat were it 
not for legal restrictions they would be able to be more specific 
about the improvements hey intend to introduce.25 
C. The Informal Management Campaign 
In addition to developing the formal themes used in speeches 
and campaign literature, the labor relations professional will try to 
establish a managerial style during the campaign which will help to 
22 A typical employer letter making this claim states: "What the union organizers want 
is money. Your money! These union organizers are out here for the thousands and 
thousands of dollars that they hope to get out of you in the form of initiation fees, union 
dues, and union assessments. You must decide whether to let these outsiders get their hands 
in your pockets. But make no mistake, it is your money that this union is really after." 
LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 7, at 79. 
23 An employer might argue as follows: "Now I'm not going to say that unions haven't 
done a fine job . . In years gone by, I'm sure John L. Lewis did great things for the 
coal miners, but let's take a good look at unions today. They're big, they're rich, they've got 
investments in Florida, big night clubs down there . . . . They are paying themselves 
$150,000 bucks a year . . . . Do you want to give them more money to squander on these 
things?" Id. 
24 A typical company statement concludes: "Why pay dues and why run the risk of a 
union forced strike . . . to get what you can get free to you." Id. at 80. 
25 The following approach is common: "People say we need a pension program . . . . I 
want you and the National Labor Relations Board to understand that I am not promising 
you anything, but one of the things we have been kicking around and talking about is what 
we call income protection insurance." Id. 
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convince employees that it is futile or risky to vote yes and that 
improvements will likely follow once the union is defeated. The 
mood is created through a variety of basic stylistic decisions. These 
include how active a campaign to conduct, how much to involve 
lower-level management in the process, how overtly to try to 
arouse fear of the employer's response to unionization, whether to 
use question-and-answer sessions, and whether to make a serious 
effort o keep the campaign within the law. 
Almost every professional has certain tactics that he or she 
regularly uses. Some typically instruct management o give em- 
ployees two paychecks ometime close to the election, one consist- 
ing of the amount of union dues which would be deducted from the 
employees' pay under a union contract and one for the balance. 
Some favor handing out "guarantee letters" which the employees 
are asked to present to the union organizer for signature. Some 
professionals like to conduct a survey in which employees are 
asked questions about their job attitudes in such a way as to sug- 
gest that changes will be made without falling into the legal traps 
of soliciting grievances or promising benefits. Many professionals 
routinely employ delay, litigating questions about the election at 
great length in hopes that time will cool the employees' ardor for 
the union and demonstrate the union's impotence. Employers are 
often urged to get tough, to discharge employees thought to be 
union sympathizers as soon as they step out of line in any way. 
Some professionals urge their clients to act friendlier and more ac- 
commodating, while most suggest a business as usual approach. 
During their practice most consultants develop a style that 
they regularly employ. This, together with the similarity of formal 
campaigns, means that a well-informed union faced with a cam- 
paign run by a known management consultant can anticipate with 
considerable assurance what kind of tactics it will face. 
D. The Union's Response 
Unions have standard campaign tactics and arguments to 
counter each of the employer tactics described above. Union litera- 
ture will stress that in the vast majority of cases contracts are ne- 
gotiated without a strike, and it will add that decisions concerning 
bargaining positions are made by the employees themselves. Often 
the union will affirm its desire to be reasonable and permit the 
employer a fair profit. 
Experienced organizers will turn around the argument that 
they are unable to guarantee improvements. One organizer 
presented with an employer's guarantee letter explained his refusal 
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to sign as follows: "What you get from the Company isn't up to 
me, it depends on how strong you are and what you want. It's your 
local union, and if you support it, you'll be successful."26 The 
union may issue a guarantee letter of its own promising that no 
strike will be called except by a two-thirds vote of the employees 
and pledging not to collect dues until a collective bargaining agree- 
ment is signed with benefits far greater than the dues. Unions will 
respond to claims of personal favors to employees by arguing that 
such favors would not have been necessary in a unionized shop.27 
Most unions will stress that they are an accepted part of the Amer- 
ican industrial system. They have in their files pro-union state- 
ments from noted public figures of all political persuasions and 
from varied ethnic backgrounds. Which quotes are used in a par- 
ticular election depends upon the makeup of the work force. Vari- 
ous papal statements are used where Catholic workers are in- 
volved. If a sizeable number of black voters are in the unit, a union 
may quote Martin Luther King's comment hat "the labor hater is 
always a two-headed creature spewing anti-negro talk from one 
mouth and anti-union propaganda from the other."28 
If promises or improvements are made by the employer the 
union will claim credit for them. A typical union letter argued, "It 
took Local 561 to make the company discuss your needs, but have 
you been promised anything definite? Is it in writing? Is it signed? 
Whose word do you have that conditions will improve? The word 
of the company? Up to now it hasn't been worth much to you."29 
The union is almost certain to criticize the employer's cam- 
paign. It will claim that the employer is trying to win the election 
by unfairly frightening the employees or by trying to buy them off. 
Increasingly unions make the company lawyer or management con- 
sultant an issue by attacking both the unfair style and the high 
fees. "It's a shame that the tremendous fee that is being paid Mr. 
Flynn is not used as pay raises for you, instead of its being used for 
scare letters."30 
26 Id. at 83. 
27 A variant of the following argument might be used: "Mathews claims to be proud 
that employees have come to him with family, personal, and financial problems. Most or all 
of these problems have been financial. The employees had a problem living on the wages 
paid by the company . . . . This is not the type of problem Mathews should be proud to 
have his employees discuss with him. The answer to your problems is not to go to the plant 
manager. The answer is your union!" Id. 
28 Id. at 84. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 12:20:53 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1986] Union Organizing in the Private Sector 55 
Unions respond to the argument hat they are outsiders by 
stressing local control. "You are the union" is a line used in virtu- 
ally every union campaign. Large unions will stress their power. 
"Local 743 has the full support of the Teamsters Union. The larg- 
est and strongest union in the world."'3' 
E. The Response of Employees to the Campaigns 
1. The basic dynamic. Employee reaction varies in accor- 
dance with the personalities, fears, hopes, union attitudes, and 
levels of job satisfaction of the people in the unit.32 No simple 
model can do justice to this complex reality, but certain generali- 
ties can be drawn and others inferred from the available data. 
Employees who are both favorable to the organizing union and 
dissatisfied with their jobs perceive and respond to the campaign 
differently from employees who are satisfied with their jobs and 
either unfavorable or indifferent to unions. Neither of these two 
groups is likely to be affected by the actual campaign, since their 
commitment is strong and their perception selective. The former 
perceives the employer's campaign to be far tougher and more 
threatening than does the latter. Pro-union employees assume that 
any discharge during the course of the campaign was for union ac- 
tivity, and they find threats in ambiguous statements. These per- 
ceptions do not alter their willingness to vote for the union. They 
are instead confirmed in their conclusion that the employer is un- 
fair, not to be trusted with total power over their jobs. Employees 
who are satisfied with their jobs perceive the employer's campaign 
in much friendlier terms. When asked about the content of an em- 
ployer talk they are far more likely to report hat "he was very fair. 
Told us to make up our own minds" or that he "told us the pros 
and cons of voting for the union."33 
The employees whose votes may be affected by the campaign 
are those who like their jobs in general but feel that they are un- 
fairly treated in some important way, who are favorable towards 
unions in general but who doubt the particular union's commit- 
ment or ability to improve things for them. Any employer cam- 
paign, even one that is limited to a simple sign saying "Vote No," 
will stir their apprehension by announcing that the employer is 
against unionization and that the advent of the union will not 
31 Id. at 85. 
32 See generally LAW & REALITY, supra note 7, at 53-72, 141-46 (discussing the impor- 
tance of employee predispositions). 
33 See id. at 120-29. 
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bring about change without struggle. A campaign that also demon- 
strates concern for the employees will convince some of them to 
wait and see what benefits they will get without he union. Faced 
with upsetting changes in company management or rumors of 
plant relocation, employees will often sign authorization cards but 
may be persuaded during the campaign to give the employer an- 
other chance and vote against representation.34 
Employees will also try to determine whether the union will be 
fair, reasonable, and democratic. They feel that they have some- 
thing to lose if the union is too rigid or adversarial. Some employ- 
ees are likely to decide to vote no even if they would vote for rep- 
resentation were a more effective or responsive union to come 
along. It is often the case that the local asking for the employees' 
votes is new; the organizer is likely to be a stranger to all or most 
of the employees. Since the organizer initially stands for the union, 
the employees will be likely to study her behavior for clues as to 
how the union will perform. In a typical campaign, at least some 
employees mildly favorable to unionization as an abstract concept 
will conclude on the basis of such observations that the particular 
union is unworthy of support. 
The willingness of employees to give the employer another 
chance and their frequent negative conclusions about a particular 
union mean that unions which have secured card majorities often 
lose election campaigns. The gap between card majority and final 
outcome has helped to generate two related misconceptions: first, 
that employers generally win representation campaigns by fright- 
ening employees into voting against representation; and second, 
that management consultants are particularly skillful in devising 
means of frightening employees to achieve this purpose. In analyz- 
ing our data prior to writing Union Representation Elections: Law 
and Reality,35 my co-authors and I devoted the major part of our 
analysis to the question of whether successful employer campaigns 
could be attributed to the kinds of employer acts or statements 
that the Board deemed likely to coerce employees into voting 
34 Id. at 146 ("If the employer's campaign does no more than remind employees that 
things are pretty good without the union, it may gain the support of some employees not 
wholly satisfied with working conditions, but also not wholly in favor of unions."). 
36 Supra note 7. This work was the result of a major study of Board elections that I 
undertook with Professors Goldberg and Herman during the early seventies. Our purpose 
was to test the assumptions about employee voting behavior that underlie regulation of 
campaign conduct by the Board and the courts. Knowing how controversial the legal ques- 
tion of campaign regulation is, we designed our study with great care and reported only 
those findings which we felt certain were scientifically supportable. 
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against representation. We found that successful campaigns were 
not marked by an unusually large number of employer unfair labor 
practices or employee reports of threatening statements, nor did 
employees explain their votes or those of their co-workers in terms 
that suggested fear of employer reprisal.36 We concluded from 
these data that employee voting choice is not as easy to manipulate 
as the cases suggest-that no significant advantage accrues to an 
employer who commits unfair labor practices or violates one of the 
"laboratory conditions" standards during the course of a campaign, 
as contrasted to an employer who conducts a vigorous legal 
campaign.37 
This is not to say that fear of economic onsequences plays no 
role in thwarting unionization. Concerns about the economic con- 
sequences of unionization and the possibility of employer etalia- 
tion are present before organizing ever begins. Indeed these con- 
cerns often prevent employees from seriously considering 
unionization until their dissatisfaction or concern about existing 
conditions becomes great enough to overcome their fear. It is pre- 
cisely because these fears are present before and throughout he 
campaign that they are so difficult to manipulate successfully. 
As to the second misconception, the effectiveness of manage- 
ment consultants, all of the management campaigns that we stud- 
ied in working on our book on representation elections were di- 
rected by labor relations professionals. We interviewed all but one 
of these professionals at length shortly after the election. They 
were in general earnest but not terribly imaginative people. We did 
not find them to be the skillful manipulators of employee senti- 
ment they are sometimes made out to be. In particular, those who 
regularly used illegal tactics seemed to have less awareness of cam- 
paign dynamics than those who did not. The campaigns that they 
conducted were based on simplistic models of employee behavior 
and did not depart from predictable themes and tactics. I was 
therefore not surprised when John Wilhelm told me that because 
they are so predictable, he is delighted to learn that a management 
consultant is running the employer's campaign when he is involved 
in a representation election.38 I consider the reputation of virulent 
anti-union consultants for great skill in manipulating employee 
36 See id. at 100-02, 113-16. 
37 Id. at 128-29. We also concluded that unions are at a disadvantage compared to em- 
ployers in getting their message to the employees. Id. at 95-96. 
38 Interview with John Wilhelm at Yale University (Spring 1985) (transcript on file 
with author). 
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voting behavior to be one of the great myths of labor relations. 
This myth persists and expands because its propagation is in the 
interests both of the consultants, who derive business from being 
perceived as tough and effective, and of the union organizers, who 
can then explain their failures in terms of the skill, resources, and 
ruthlessness of their opponents. 
This is not to say that union organizers are being dishonest, 
but rather that it is a welcome conclusion to explain an otherwise 
surprising loss. Furthermore, the organizers learn much of what 
they know about the effectiveness ofthe campaign from the em- 
ployees who support the union. If the employees from whom the 
organizer gets information are inaccurate, the organizer is likely to 
be misled. In one of the campaigns we studied in which the em- 
ployees voted against representation after the union had obtained 
a card majority, the organizer told me that he thought he manage- 
ment campaign was effective for two reasons: the employer 
threatened the employees with reprisal, and the employer pointed 
out that employees were subject to arbitrary treatment and unrea- 
sonable fines under the international union's constitution. The or- 
ganizer thought hat the latter issue had been particularly effec- 
tive. But during our interviews, only four employees mentioned 
this issue-and all of them had voted for the union. The organizer 
obviously thought this issue was effective because it stirred up 
some of his most loyal supporters. A similar dynamic took place 
with regard to the employer's allegedly threatening behavior. This 
is quite common. Organizers regularly reported that the issues 
which moved the electorate were the ones that impressed their 
strongest supporters. These were not, however, the issues men- 
tioned by the employees who had signed authorization cards but 
later voted against representation. These employees rarely tell the 
organizer why they shifted their allegiance. Even if they do, they 
are likely to tell the organizer that they acted out of fear, rather 
than in response to the organizer's inadequate performance. 
2. The successful employer campaign. Although our study 
showed that employer coercion and professional expertise do not 
play as significant a role in election outcomes as commonly 
thought, we did not develop a scientifically supportable conclusion 
concerning the positive elements of a successful employer cam- 
paign. On the basis of my observations, however, I have found that 
the successful campaign achieves two objectives: it sustains and in- 
creases the employees' concern about how the union would per- 
form if chosen, and it convinces employees that the employer's 
past record shows that it deserves their support, or at least a sec- 
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ond chance.39 
During the course of our study I did an analysis of reasons 
given by employees for their votes. I divided the reasons given by 
employees into those denoting positive feelings towards the em- 
ployer (such as loyalty, satisfaction, and the hope for improve- 
ment) and those denoting negative feelings (fear of retaliation or 
other harmful consequences hould the union be chosen). I found 
that the ratio of positive to negative reasons was far higher in suc- 
cessful employer campaigns-campaigns in which a high percent- 
age of card-signers or employees who originally intended to vote 
for representation ending up voting no. The scale was my own and 
I developed no sharply defined standard for allocating reasons to 
categories. Accordingly, my colleagues quite properly concluded 
that these data had no place in a scientific report of our conclu- 
sions. Yet these data conformed so well to the impression I got 
from talking to the employees during and after such campaigns 
that I have since felt that this non-rigorous method captured a 
great truth. Appeals to loyalty in an employer campaign are much 
more potent than threats, which fit better into the image of unfair- 
ness that unions generally seek to exploit. Employer threats often 
underline for employees their need for protection. 
3. The successful union campaign. The employer enters 
most campaigns with three advantages. First, it has instant and 
prolonged access to the employees. Second, it can offer to employ- 
ees the possibility of improvement without cost and without the 
creation of a new bureaucracy. Finally, it can play on the fact that 
most people find the thought of substantial change in their lives 
frightening. It is the task of the union organizer to overcome these 
disadvantages or even to turn them to the union's benefit. She 
must find a way to get her message heard by the uncommitted em- 
ployees. She must convince them that the union is composed not 
of outsiders but of concerned fellow employees, that the changes 
which the union proposes are worth fighting for, that the union 
will be able to protect employees against reprisal, and that the 
union's officials can be trusted. 
a. The Relationship Between the Organizer and the Employ- 
ees. The organizer must get to know the employees and address 
their particular concerns. She cannot rely on routine campaign tac- 
tics and messages; prepackaged materials, no matter how well pre- 
pared, are inadequate. This is a tremendously demanding task. To 
39 See LAW AND REALITY, supra note 7, at 108. 
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do it successfully requires a rare combiination fsensitivity, tough- 
ness, and enthusiasm. The organizer must also work to develop a 
strong internal organization. This is a crucial part of the union 
campaign. It is the inside organizing committee that conveys the 
union's message directly to those employees who do not attend 
union meetings. The committee, made up of employees, constitutes 
the best response to the argument hat the union is run by outsid- 
ers unaware of and indifferent to the needs of the employees. 
Moreover, as previously noted, without an effective employee team 
the professional organizer will not understand campaign dynamics 
and may fail to recognize the crucial local issues. 
The key to developing broad-based activism is the ability of 
the organizer to convey her own commitment and concern. One-on- 
one meetings with employees, getting to know who they are and 
what they care about, are crucial to the organizer's uccess. Or- 
ganizers who reject or try to minimize home visits on the grounds 
that the employees will resent interference with their free time are 
mistaken. Employees have strong views about their jobs that they 
are eager to tell to someone they think really cares. I learned that 
this was particularly true of employees who at first seem indiffer- 
ent to the campaign and unwilling to talk to anyone about it. Such 
employees are frequently expressing more than anything else the 
sentiment hat "no one really cares about what I have to say be- 
cause I am uninformed and confused." 
Because the employees use the campaign to evaluate the 
union, mistakes by the organizer are more likely to be costly than 
are mistakes by the employer epresentative. During the course of 
my study, I felt on several occasions that unions lost elections 
which they could have won but for campaign errors. The most 
common mistake was failure to convey personal interest in the em- 
ployees. This mistake took several forms: over-reliance on formal 
campaign literature, too many mass meetings, working almost ex- 
clusively with one or two people on the employee committee, and 
most significantly, not getting to know the rank-and-file members. 
A second common mistake is the use of personal attacks on indi- 
vidual members of management. These, unless very carefully and 
skillfully done, are generally thought o be unfair by undecided 
workers, and they give support to the management claim that un- 
ions are divisive. 
b. Who Speaks for the Union? The best organizing efforts 
constantly put forward the employee voice as the voice of the 
union. Curiously, my experience suggests that the importance of 
projecting the rank-and-file voice seems to be best understood by 
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organizers who did not themselves come from the rank and 
file-perhaps because organizers who came out of the ranks have 
difficulty realizing that the employees no longer perceive them as 
"one of us." Most of the Yale organizers began as outsiders to the 
labor movement: they were college-educated people who first 
learned their craft doing community organizing. They were careful 
not to represent hemselves as the rank and file, nor to speak as 
though they were the most important part of the organizing pro- 
cess. They kept stating to me that the committee organizes the em- 
ployees and that their own job was to support the committee. The 
only staff person who regularly spoke for the union was John Wil- 
helm, who made it a point never to appear by himself at a public 
meeting and to let the rank-and-file people take the lead. The 
great majority of those who spoke at union meetings and public 
rallies were clerical and technical workers rather than organizers. 
Most had little previous experience addressing meetings. By the 
end of the strike the union had developed a group of speakers, 
mostly women who had been at the university for many years, who 
were notable for their eloquence and their sincerity. 
A sense of the potency of this approach is conveyed by a Yale 
clerical worker who later joined the staff of the union: 
I was brought on by one of the paid organizers . ... She 
pulled me forward. In fact in this union one thing that hap- 
pens . . . is that you can be catapulted to great heights within 
a small amount of time. I came on in August and in November 
I'm speaking at a big rally. It's crazy! . . . There was a reason 
that I became involved then and didn't earlier, and that was 
because I realized that this was a very different organizing 
drive, and I have seen some of the others and they just 
weren't he same. They weren't built from the bottom up like 
this union was . . .. [T]he paid organizers went out and 
through some sort of grapevine . . . built a committee of 500 
people. That was such a tremendous base from which to begin 
that it was a much more personal sort of thing than leafletting 
on the street corners, which is what we'd done in the '77 
drive.40 
40 Interview with Lee Berman at Yale University (Spring 1985) (transcript on file with 
author). For a description of the very effective women speakers involved in the strike, see 
Ladd-Taylor, Woman Workers and the Yale Strike, 11 FEMINIST STUDIES 465 (1985). In 
addition to the major speakers there were people like the law school's Isabel Poludnewycz, 
whose leadership, warmth, and organizational skills helped to make the law school staff the 
strongest union group on campus. 
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The process by which rank-and-file leaders and other potential 
union activists are identified and encouraged to participate in the 
union is complex. The organizer must be aware of the employees' 
fears and concerns but not overcome by them. The psychological 
astuteness necessary for this task is suggested by an interview that 
I conducted with a rank-and-file activist who had played a major 
role in the Yale organizing drive and strike. 
Getman: "Did you feel pushed by the union?" 
Andrea: "I wanted to be pushed. I really enjoyed taking 
on more and more . . . but there were times when they 
pushed me to do things that I felt were difficult or didn't want 
to do, but afterwards I felt good about it." 
Getman: "Such as what?" 
Andrea: "Like this building . . . where there's this group 
of anti-union people. They were extremely hostile and it was 
much easier for me to ignore them and speak to people who 
were receptive . . . but [an organizer] was pushing me and we 
went in there and had a couple of major arguments and after- 
wards I felt good that I did it and the next time it wasn't 
quite so difficult.""4 
This story reflects how sensitive a good organizer must be. If the 
organizer had been wrong in thinking that Andrea would do well in 
such a situation, the approach might have backfired. Organizers 
who are less perceptive tend to be more passive than the organizer 
was in this situation-which is why few are as good. 
One result of this emphasis on the employee voice was that 
many of my Yale colleagues were astonished by the number of ar- 
ticulate and committed rank-and-file p ople who emerged to speak 
for the union during the organizing drive and subsequent strike. 
Some concluded that this phenomenon was a special tribute to the 
high intellectual caliber of Yale employees. John Wilhelm does not 
agree. He believes that such people are regularly present in any 
substantial work force, and that the job of the union organizer is to 
seek them out and encourage them to speak out. All my own expe- 
rience supports his conclusion. 
c. Immunization. A skillful union organizer may blunt much 
of the employer's campaign by predicting it. This permits the 
union to take credit for the implied promises and reduces the fear 
of harmful consequences by showing that such claims are an ex- 
4' Interview with Andrea Ross at Yale University (Spring 1985) (transcript on file with 
author). 
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pected part of the employer's campaign. A Teamsters organizer in 
Indiana whose success rate was excellent used to read publicly at 
one of his early meetings from a pamphlet instructing employers 
about how to defeat a union organizing campaign. He would post a 
list of employer campaign statements and tactics on the union's 
bulletin board and check them off when they occurred. 
In its organizing drive at Yale, Local 34 introduced someone at 
a meeting whom they described as a member of the Yale personnel 
department, who was being given a chance to speak in the interest 
of fairness. This person, in reality a teacher and a strong union 
supporter, made all the traditional anti-union arguments with such 
force that many employees were incensed and many others wayed. 
Afterwards, union officials conducted critiques of these arguments. 
Although the benefits of this tactic, referred to as "immunization" 
by Local 34, seem to me obvious, it is not used by most or- 
ganizers-some because they do not want to give exposure to anti- 
union arguments, some because they are not sure of how to re- 
spond to those arguments. 
d. Fervor. The union movement which Vinnie Sirabella 
joined in the 1930s used passionate oratory, protest songs, and per- 
sonal testifying to organize. His first exposure to the cause of 
unionization came when he listened to Anna B., "The Red Flame," 
orating in the Balbo Hill district of Providence, excoriating the 
bosses and the political system which permitted exploitation.42 To- 
day such passion is generally missing from union organizing, which 
is much more based on carefully worded rational argument and ec- 
onomic inducements.43 Yet, as modern evangelicals exemplify, pas- 
sion is still a vital part of commitment. The Yale representation 
campaign had a religious flavor. People told of their earlier failures 
and temptations and of their ultimate redemption and rebirth. 
When Lucille Dickess described how she had fought unionism in 
the past and how she had become converted by realizing that the 
University officials did not truly respect her, people wept, cheered 
and stood up to applaud her. The union conducted candlelight vig- 
ils and silent witnesses, and engaged in acts of civil disobedience. 
One of the organizers told me that he wept at every rally the union 
42 Interview with Vincent Sirabella, New Haven, Conn. (Spring 1985) (transcript on file 
with author). 
" Indeed, the AFL-CIO, adopting an approach suggested by Professor Medoff, hopes 
to turn its organizing failures around by offering "associate membership" to employees who 
join up to obtain special economic benefits (such as insurance) through the union. See AFL- 
CIO News, Nov. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 2; J. Medoff, The Public Image of Labor and Labor's 
Response 37-38 (Nov. 1984) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). 
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conducted. These are not only the tactics of organizing but of com- 
mitment, and it is this more than anything which marked the Yale 
drive and permitted the union to conduct an effective strike. 
When the union asked people to sign authorization cards, it 
also passed out a paper instructing people not to sign unless they 
really wanted the union and intended to join up. When employees 
expressed a willingness to sign up but not to become active, they 
were frequently told that the union did not have such a category of 
membership. An older employee who had previously been in two 
other unions told me that Local 34 was the most demanding organ- 
ization he had ever been involved with. A very large percentage of 
the members were on one union committee or another. The reason 
why the employees did not feel exploited was because their own 
commitment was matched by that of the organizers, who were as 
notable for their passion as for their youth and intelligence. As one 
of the organizers told me, "I do think there was an incredible in- 
vestment on the part of us in the workers' lives. . . . I'm not say- 
ing that that was unique or anything, but I think that there was 
real strength in that. We were not just professionals, we were right 
in there, and so I was moved constantly by what was going on."44 
Vincent Sirabella does not think that effective organizing can 
be conducted in the private sector unless the organizer is passion- 
ate, committed, and capable of stirring others. This does not mean 
ranting or crying, or even being eloquent. It means caring deeply 
and communicating that to the employees. The task is a complex 
and demanding one. Yet the problems that underlie the labor 
movement's failures in organizing reflect not merely the difficulty 
of the job, but also the low priority which the labor movement as- 
signed to this most crucial task. There is surprisingly widespread 
agreement within the labor movement that for a long time the un- 
ions' ablest people have sought and received jobs doing collective 
bargaining and grievance handling instead of organizing. Donald 
Ephlin, now Vice President of the United Auto Workers in charge 
of their General Motors division, told me that during the sixties 
and seventies almost all unions undervalued the importance of or- 
ganizing.45 Many unions overestimated their own strength-they 
were satisfied with their membership and did not recognize the 
need to expand. Vinnie Sirabella stated recently that the labor 
" Interview with Paul Clifford at Yale University (Spring 1985) (transcript on file with 
author). 
4 Conversation with Donald Ephlin in New Haven, Conn. (Sept., 1979). 
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movement has ignored the need to organize for over two decades." 
Having worked with both union leaders and rank-and-file p o- 
ple for many years, I have been struck by the failure of most un- 
ions to draw on the tremendous amount of talent, intelligence, and 
dedication to the labor movement among the rank and file. Staff 
appointments too often are determined by internal political con- 
siderations rather than by ability. Indeed, employees likely to 
threaten established ways of doing things are often automatically 
excluded from leadership positions. It is not atypical that Vinnie 
Sirabella, long an outcast in his own union, preached the impor- 
tance of adopting new organizing techniques for years before the 
leadership of his union paid any attention to him. What is surpris- 
ing is that he had the patience and strength of character to perse- 
vere, and that he responded with enthusiasm rather than anger 
when the international union finally decided to adopt the methods 
which he had urged on them for so long in vain. 
II. REGULATION IN THE ORGANIZING CONTEXT 
If my description of campaign dynamics is accurate, it follows 
that the tremendous concern which the Board has lavished upon 
the nuances of employer conduct and speech has been beside the 
point and misleading. 
Given the fact that the first amendment protects an em- 
ployer's right to speak against unionization,47 the practical differ- 
ence between legal and illegal employer campaigns will continue to 
be insignificant. Employers by the very fact of a campaign may 
arouse anxieties and concern, but they will not affect more votes 
than they could have swayed by making traditional egal anti- 
union arguments. Indeed it seems likely that the most effective 
employer campaign is a legal one which plays upon employee loy- 
alty and fear of the union rather than on fear of the employer. The 
two major empirical studies of the impact of employer unfair labor 
practices have both concluded that they make no difference.48 In 
Law and Reality, we urged on the basis of such data that the 
Board stop regulating employer speech and eliminate the "labora- 
tory conditions" approach and the various doctrines which have 
46 V. Sirabella, supra note 3, at 3. 
47 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (? 8(c) "merely imple- 
ments the First Amendment"). 
48 See LAW & REALITY, supra note 7, at 128-30; Cooper, Authorization Cards and 
Union Representation Election Outcomes, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 87, 114-18 (1984). 
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developed under it.49 Our recommendations have been opposed on 
a variety of grounds.50 Many have claimed that they are potentially 
dangerous to unions and if followed would present employers with 
an opportunity to escalate their use of fear and coercion. Even 
those who doubt the efficacy of Board regulation assume that it is 
worthwhile on the chance that it provides unions with a degree of 
protection against employer intimidation.5' These arguments as- 
sume that Board regulation works in favor of the unions if it works 
at all; since unions are currently doing badly in contested elections, 
a suggestion to reduce Board protection is particularly ill-timed. 
At one time I accepted the logic of this position, but I have 
become convinced that the price, both legal and practical, which 
the unions have paid for the regulation of employer speech has far 
exceeded the possible benefits. My conclusion rests on two prem- 
ises: first, that when the Board intervenes in an election on the 
union's behalf, the union rarely benefits; and second, that the cur- 
rent trend in the law to ignore legitimate and important union in- 
terests is due in part to a desire to preserve "balance" in the face 
of what is perceived to be unusual administrative and judicial pro- 
tection of unions. 
49 LAW AND REALITY, supra note 7, at 159. The Board's response to our recommenda- 
tions was very negative. In General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), the 
Board majority stated that this "1 study of only 31 elections in 1 area of the coun- 
try-although it may provide room for thought-is simply not sufficient o disprove the 
assumptions upon which the Board has regulated election conduct." Id. at 622. F'or a discus- 
sion of the inadequacy of the Board's treatment of the study, see Shapiro, Book Review, 86 
YALE L.J. 1532, 1543 (1977). See generally Goldberg, Getman & Brett, Union Representa- 
tion Elections: Law and Reality: The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79 MICH. L. REV. 564, 
573-80 (1981) (discussing the Board's response) [hereinafter cited as The Authors Respond]. 
5O See, e.g., Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist's 
Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1976); Kochan, Legal Nonsense, Empirical Examina- 
tion and Policy Evaluation, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1976); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Secur- 
ing Workers' Right to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1783-84 
(1983); Peck, Book Review, 53 U. WASH. L. REV. 197 (1977); Shapiro, supra note 49. See 
generally The Authors Respond, supra note 49, at 580-93 (discussing critics' response). 
bl In an influential article, Paul Weiler wrote: 
It may be legitimate for Getman and his coauthors to conclude that their own data do 
not demonstrate with certainty that employer coercion affects employee voting, but it 
is entirely unjustified to infer from that fact alone that the contrary is true. The failure 
to find a statistically significant connection between employer intimidation and em- 
ployee votes in this limited sample neither proves that there is no such relationship nor 
provides a basis on which to argue that we may safely abandon efforts to protect em- 
ployee choice. . . Given the inherent plausibility of the notion that employees will 
respond to threats to the jobs that are crucial to their lives, and given that the data in 
the Getman study indicate that it is more likely than not that such threats do affect 
employee votes, it is only prudent to take steps that will ensure freedom of choice in 
the workplace. 
Weiler, supra note 50, at 1783-84. 
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A. The Effects of Board Intervention 
When the Board finds that an employer has violated one of its 
rules in the course of a campaign, its normal remedy is to set aside 
the election and order it reheld after an appropriate period. Board 
reports how that unions lose re-run elections in the great majority 
of cases.62 Unions are aware of this, and sometimes do not even 
wage a campaign. Union victories in subsequent elections are due 
to the employees' perception that the employer has no intention of 
making good on the implied promises made during the campaign. 
It takes time for the realization to spread and sink in that unless 
there is a union, things will go on as they always have. By the time 
it does sink in, almost invariably a year will have passed and the 
union will be able to petition for a new election without the 
Board's intervention.53 
The effectiveness of the Board's remedies against employer 
unfair labor practices during an organizing campaign thus turns 
largely on the bargaining order, by which an employer who has 
committed serious unfair labor practices is required to bargain 
with a union that has a card majority even though the union did 
not capture a majority in the election.54 At first blush the bargain- 
ing order seems to be extremely powerful, effective enough to rem- 
edy the particular violations to which it is applied and to deter 
other employers from committing similar unfair labor practices in 
the future. What evidence we have, however, suggests that bargain- 
ing orders are far less potent than they first appear. Unions that 
obtain bargaining orders often do not obtain contracts.66 The rea- 
son is apparent. A bargaining order is indirectly an admission that 
the union does not represent a majority of employees. A union that 
does not speak for an active majority is in a terrible position when 
it comes to obtaining concessions from an employer.56 Thus the 
union must either accept a weak contract or face the prospect of an 
"2 See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REV. 209 (1963). According 
to Pollitt's study, unions that obtained re-run elections on the basis of employer unfair la- 
bor practices won only 30% of those elections. Id. at 212. 
b3 See National Labor Relations Act ? 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. ? 159(c)(3) (1982) (requiring 
one year between elections). 
b4 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597-603 (1969) (holding that a card 
majority can serve as the basis for an obligation to bargain if an employer's coercive conduct 
rendered cards a better indicator of employee choice than was the election). 
bb See Wolkinson, The Remedial Efficacy of NLRB Remedies on Joy Silk Cases, 55 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1969). 
be Wolkinson notes that this effect is present regardless of the size of the card majority, 
and is due not only to the degree of employer interference, but also to the union's economic 
and financial resources. Id. at 19. 
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unsuccessful strike. Either alternative gives validity to many of the 
employer's pre-election arguments about the powerlessness of the 
union. 
Furthermore, the issuance of bargaining orders is not easily 
squared with the policy of employee free choice, because such or- 
ders always override existing employee sentiment. As a result, 
courts have been hesitant o enforce bargaining orders.57 To many 
management lawyers and professionals, the prospect of prolonged 
litigation over a bargaining order ending in a victory for manage- 
ment is quite appealing. Thus management advisors who favor the 
effort o intimidate do not consider the possibility of a bargaining 
order as reason for altering their styles. 
B. Anti-Union Bias of the Board and Courts 
Recent years have seen a number of significant changes in 
American labor law. The Board and the courts have limited the 
scope of collective bargaining and reduced the protection afforded 
by collective agreements.58 They have made it almost impossible 
for employees covered by collective agreements to protest discrimi- 
natory employer actions to the Board.59 They have reduced the 
protection afforded by section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act.60 They have increased the obligations of unions to nonmem- 
bers6l and the likelihood that unions will be held liable to their 
members for actions taken in good faith.62 It has become easier for 
b7 See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 
681, 685 (1972). For the further suggestion that the Board should "proceed cautiously in the 
issuance of bargaining orders," see id. at 698. 
b8 See generally Getman, The Courts and Collective Bargaining, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
969 (1983) (discussing increased judicial hostility to collective bargaining). 
b9 In United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984), the Board held that 
where a charge under ? 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. ? 158(a)(1) (1982), alleges conduct 
which may form the basis for a grievance which is arbitrable under a collective bargaining 
agreement, the Board must defer to arbitration. 
60 29 U.S.C. ? 157 (1982). In Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 496-97 (1984), 
the Board reversed a line of cases which had held that conduct by an individual employee 
seeking to improve safety conditions in the workplace was "concerted" and therefore pro- 
tected under ? 7. 
61 In Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1196 (7th Cir. 1984), 
the court held that nonmembers required to pay agency fees to a union as a condition of 
employment were entitled to elaborate procedural safeguards of their first amendment right 
not to have their fees spent by the union for the support of political or ideological causes. 
The court suggested in dicta that an internal union remedy combined with arbitration 
would be constitutionally inadequate. Id. at 1194-96. 
62 For example, in Smith v. Hussmann Refrigerator Co., 619 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980), 
a union represented four employees it claimed were entitled to a posted position on the 
basis of seniority. The collective bargaining agreement contained a modified seniority sys- 
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employers to transfer work or terminate jobs in response to union 
activity.63 The reach of the restrictive secondary boycott provisions 
has been expanded, and the Supreme Court has specifically an- 
nounced that the first amendment right of unions to enlist the sup- 
port of other employees and customers is entitled to a lower level 
of constitutional protection than are the rights of other groups 
seeking social change.64 
That these developments reflect an anti-union trend seems to 
me obvious. This trend has been widely noted.65 It is less obvious 
that this trend draws considerable strength from the over-regula- 
tion of employer speech. Yet in several areas the connection seems 
so clear that any realistic hope for change in a direction favorable 
to unions would require a corresponding change in the regulation 
of employer campaign tactics. 
1. Regulation of Union Campaign Tactics. The courts have 
often imposed foolish restrictions on union campaign tactics. For 
example, in NLRB v. Savair Manufacturing Co.,66 the Supreme 
Court solemnly declared that employees might be coerced into vot- 
ing for representation if unions could waive dues and initiation 
fees for those employees who signed authorization cards during the 
campaign.67 The Court justified its conclusion by reference to its 
earlier decision in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,68 which had de- 
nied employers the right to make or promise benefits during a 
campaign, quoting its statement here that employees were "not 
likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now con- 
ferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and 
tem, in which seniority was to govern certain job transfers only where skill and ability were 
substantially equal. The court held that because the union had failed to satisfy itself that 
the employees whose case it supported uring arbitration were equal in ability to those who 
had been given the positions, "sufficient evidence existed for the jury to conclude that the 
union exceeded the permissible range of reasonableness with regard to its representation" of
the employees whose qualifications for the opening were merit-based-even though the em- 
ployer took the position of the "merit" employees in the arbitration proceeding. Id. at 1239. 
63 See, e.g., Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483 (llth Cir. 1982) (reversing 
due to lack of substantial evidence a decision of the Board that partial plant closing was 
retaliatory and constituted a violation of ? 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. ? 158(a)(3) 
(1982)). 
64 See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text; see also Getman, Labor Law and Free 
Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 12-19 (1984). 
65 See Oversight Hearings on the Subject "Has Labor Law Failed": Joint Hearings 
before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education 
and Labor and the Subcomm. on Manpower and Housing of the House Comm. on Govern- 
ment Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), and materials cited therein. 
66 414 U.S. 270 (1973). 
67 Id. at 277-78, 281. 
68 375 U.S. 405 (1964). 
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which may dry up if it is not obliged."69 This suggestion that em- 
ployees who receive or are promised benefits respond as though 
they have been threatened makes little sense as applied to employ- 
ers, and none as applied to unions.70 But the reference to Ex- 
change Parts makes clear that the Court was motivated by the de- 
sire to be even-handed in its treatment of unions and employers. 
The same patronizing vision of employees as easily manipulated 
informs the approach to both. Similarly, during the periods in 
which the Board has regulated campaign representations, the 
courts have been zealous in insisting that union statements con- 
cerning ains achieved at other facilities be stated with precision.71 
As the earlier discussion shows, the loss of one or another 
stock campaign statement will have little effect on the success of 
union organizing. Nonetheless, regulation of campaign tactics leads 
in many instances to the overturning of elections, and it must be 
understood that overturning a union victory is a more serious mat- 
ter than is overturning an employer victory. In the latter case, the 
company continues to operate free of the union-the same result 
as the election would have provided-until a new election is held 
and the union is victorious. In the former, however, employees who 
voted for the union are denied representation. Thus, a rule which 
was purportedly created to insure even-handedness has in reality 
worked against unions. 
2. The Issue of Access. Employers have easy and instant ac- 
cess to their employees during an organizing campaign. Although 
the Supreme Court recognized quite early that the right to con- 
sider the pros and cons of organization is included under section 7 
of the NLRA, unions do not have a comparable opportunity to 
state the case for representation, and the trend of the law is to- 
ward limiting their opportunities still further. The two leading 
cases dealing with union access are NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co.72 and NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (NuTone, 
Inc.).7 In Babcock & Wilcox, the Court held that an employer 
could normally "post his property against nonemployee[s]," which 
69 Id. at 409, quoted in Savair, 414 U.S. at 280. 
70 See, e.g., Savair, 414 U.S. at 285 (White, J., dissenting) ("the union glove is not very 
velvet" and "in the union context, the fist is missing"). 
71 See Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regula- 
tion of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation (pt. 2), 28 STAN. L. REV. 
263, 264-65 (1976) (discussing treatment of misleading union statements about benefits se- 
cured in other bargaining units). 
72 351 U.S. 105 (1955). 
73 357 U.S. 357 (1958). 
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meant that professional union organizers could be kept off the 
premises.74 In NuTone, the Court held that employers who engage 
in anti-union solicitation are not thereby required to permit unions 
to solicit on the premises.76 While the Court in both cases recog- 
nized the propriety of granting the union greater access if the 
Board found a significant imbalance in informational opportuni- 
ties,76 the Board has only rarely exercised this power.77 Both liberal 
and conservative Boards have denied union claims for access when- 
ever the union had any possibility of reaching the employees 
through other means. Even during periods in which the Board has 
been quite sensitive to the possibility of employer coercion, it has 
not granted unions greater access to the employees as a means of 
overcoming the coercive impact deemed to be inherent in the em- 
ployees' economic dependence upon the employer. They have in- 
stead sought to provide protection through the extension of Board 
doctrines limiting employer campaign statements and tactics. Yet 
it seems clear that greater access would be a much more effective 
way to permit unions to overcome whatever coercive advantage the 
employer obtains from its position. It makes far more sense to per- 
mit unions to make an immediate response to employer threats 
than for the Board to respond by setting aside an election or issu- 
ing a bargaining order long after the election has been held or 
postponed. 
Even apart from the need to offset he impact of employer co- 
ercion, greater access would be an extremely important right for all 
unions. Data indicate that familiarity with the union's case is posi- 
tively correlated with voting for the union.78 Moreover, the very 
fact of union access would be an effective message to the employ- 
ees that the law has the power to grant unions a significant role 
despite employer opposition. Direct access would give the employ- 
ees a more realistic appreciation of what selecting the union would 
mean. The missing ingredient of free choice is most likely to be a 
sense of the particular union involved in the campaign: its repre- 
sentatives, its arguments, and its record. It seems obvious that em- 
ployees who know the employer but are doubtful about the union 
ought to be given the chance to learn about the union at first hand. 
74 351 U.S. at 112. 
76 357 U.S. at 362-63. 
76 See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112; NuTone, 357 U.S. at 363-64. 
77 See Note, Property Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by Non-Em- 
ployee Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374, 382 n.46 (1984). 
78 See LAW & REALITY, supra note 7, at 104-07. 
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It is thus remarkable how little Board or judicial concern has been 
directed to the issue of greater union access. 
The law relating to access is generally explained in terms of 
the courts' protectiveness of property rights. But this cannot be 
the entire story.79 Behind the law's almost total unwillingness to 
grant access must rest an unstated quid pro quo: since campaign 
regulation prevents employers from stating their most effective ar- 
guments, it is fair to require unions to scramble to get their 
messages heard. 
Every union organizer to whom I have put the question ac- 
knowledges that this is a poor trade. When I interviewed Vicki 
Saporta, Director of Organizing for the Teamsters, she politely but 
firmly accused me of understating the potency of employer coer- 
cion. But when I asked her if she would be willing to give up Board 
regulation of employer speech in return for equal access, she did 
not hesitate for a moment before answering in the affirmative.80 
Her response was the same as that of every other major figure in 
union organizing to whom I have put the question. Yet the theme 
of employer coercion is constantly struck by unions and their aca- 
demic supporters while the claim for equal access is rarely made.8' 
3. Union Free Speech Claims. In NLRB v. Retail Store Em- 
ployees Local 1001 (Safeco Title Insurance Co.)82 and in Interna- 
tional Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International, Inc.,83 
the Supreme Court extended the reach of the secondary boycott 
provisions of the NLRA.84 Safeco prohibited a peaceful picketing 
effort aimed at convincing consumers not to purchase a particular 
product,85 and Allied prohibited a boycott aimed at protesting 
7 Courts have recently shown a willingness to recognize that employees have a prop- 
erty interest in their jobs, and thus may only be discharged for cause. To the extent that 
employees are drawn to unions out of concern for job security, courts should recognize that 
union organizing at least presents a case of conflicting property rights. See Note, supra note 
77, at 391-92. 
8O Interview with Vicki Saporta, New Haven, Conn. (Spring 1985) (transcript on file 
with author). 
81 It is noteworthy that Professor Weiler's important article on union organizing, which 
deals extensively with the question of intimidation, does not even deal with the issue of 
access. See Weiler, supra note 50. 
82 447 U.S. 607 (1980). 
83 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
84 National Labor Relations Act, ? 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. ? 158(b)(4) (1982). 
8" The Court distinguished NLRB v. Fruit Packers (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964), 
which permitted product picketing, on the grounds that the picketing in Safeco was directed 
against the only product sold by the neutral retailer. The Court held that such picketing 
had the same effect as an unlawful secondary boycott, Safeco, 447 U.S. at 612, and was 
therefore not protected by the first amendment, id. at 616. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.207 on Wed, 5 Jun 2013 12:20:53 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1986] Union Organizing in the Private Sector 73 
Russian involvement in Afghanistan.86 In both decisions the Court 
quickly dismissed the unions' claims that their activity was pro- 
tected by the first amendment.87 Subsequently, the Court held in 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.88 that civil rights boycotts and 
appeals to customers were constitutionally protected. In its opinion 
the court distinguished its earlier labor decisions on the grounds 
that such cases involved economic regulation89 and not the "peace- 
ful political activity" which "'has always rested on the highest 
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.'"90 
It is difficult to understand how the cause of labor, a cause 
which has been in the forefront of agitation for social change, 
which has united millions, and which has had massive political 
consequences for the most important national and international is- 
sues of our times, can be relegated to a special category of limited 
first amendment protection because it is not "political." It seems 
obvious that this approach is made far easier by the comparable 
restriction upon first amendment rights of employers which the 
Court permitted in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.91 In that case the 
Court limited employers' first amendment right to discuss the 
harmful effects of unionization to discussion of those "precise ef- 
fects" of unionization that are "demonstrably probable conse- 
quences beyond [the employer's] control."92 The decision was justi- 
fied on the grounds that because of their economic dependence 
upon the employer, employees are particularly prone to influence 
by nuances of coercion in employer speech. The Court did not rely 
on Gissel in its treatment of union picketing and boycotts. At the 
very least, however, both areas are infected by similar stereotypical 
and paternalistic visions of workers as people whose decisions are 
not made on the basis of ideas but on the basis of fear and 
coercion. 
The Court in Claiborne Hardware referred to "'the delicate 
balance'" of regulation under the National Labor Relations Act.93 
86 The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court below that secondary boycotts 
are particularly objectionable when they are "'in aid of a random political objective far 
removed from what has traditionally been thought o be the realm of legitimate union activ- 
ity.'" 456 U.S. at 225-26 (quoting 640 F.2d 1368, 1378 (lst Cir. 1981)). 
87 See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616; Allied, 456 U.S. at 226. 
88 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
89 Id. at 912. 
90 Id. at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). 
91 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
92 Id. at 618. 
93 458 U.S. at 912 (quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) (dis- 
cussing rights of neutrals). 
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Implicit in the use of the term "balance" in labor law is the idea 
that the regulation is permissible because it falls neutrally and 
evenly on both labor and management. The current balance of first 
amendment restrictions, however, is unfavorable to unions. There 
is little value to the labor movement in forcing employers to use 
slightly more roundabout ways of delivering the message that the 
advent of the union could lead to harmful consequences for the 
employees,94 but there is considerable cost to labor in not being 
able to picket peacefully to enlist the support of other workers and 
customers.95 
The Court's effort o contrast union appeals and "legitimate" 
political speech is particularly disturbing to unions like HERE 
that seek to make their case in unconventional ways and through 
appeals to varying constituencies. The reason most seasoned ob- 
servers expected the strike of the Yale clerical workers to fail was 
that the union was not in a position to shut down the enterprise or 
inflict substantial economic harm on the university through the 
withholding of services. The strategy which the union developed 
was to embarrass Yale and threaten its standing with important 
constituencies in the local community and the nation. It hoped ul- 
timately to demonstrate that it was the union which stood for the 
values of social progress, fairness, and individual excellence with 
which Yale is often associated.96 To achieve its purpose, the union 
called mass rallies, held candlelight vigils, and engaged in acts of 
civil disobedience. It brought o campus various civil rights and 
feminist leaders.97 Its purposes in using those tactics were not only 
to attract publicity but to associate itself with the civil rights 
movement, he early days of unionism, and the independent black 
trade union movement in South Africa (which frequently employs 
silent candlelight witnessing). A main thrust of the union's cam- 
paign was to attack both conscious and unconscious exist ele- 
ments in Yale's policies. The campus was filled with buttons bear- 
ing a legend of "59 cents" with a line through it. The union 
See LAW & REALITY, supra note 7, at 159-60. 
95 See Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the 
Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982). 
96 Interview ith John Wilhelm at Yale University (Spring 1985) (transcript on file 
with author). The importance of Yale's reputation is illustrated, perhaps ironically, by the 
fact that Andrea Ross took a job at Yale "with the misguided notion that it was a liberal, 
humanitarian i stitution." Interview ith Andrea Ross at Yale University (Spring 1985) 
(transcript on file with author). 
97 The group included Ralph Abernathy, Cesar Chavez, Judy Goldsmith, and Eleanor 
Smeal. See Ladd-Taylor, supra note 40. 
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brought in feminist speakers, civil rights leaders, and other social 
activists. It publicized a faculty report which demonstrated that 
women and minority employees were bunched towards the bottom 
of the employment ladder. The union conducted a teach-in during 
which the educational impact of its proposals was discussed. In va- 
rious direct and subtle ways, the union allied itself with local town 
sentiment hat saw Yale as arrogant and elitist. 
The messages which the union sought to convey through these 
tactics were: (1) that the labor movement is part of the civil rights 
movement throughout he world, committed to promoting the 
cause of the disadvantaged and aiding victims of discrimination; 
(2) that even enlightened liberal institutions like Yale have dis- 
criminated against women and minority employees; (3) that the 
cause of education did not justify poor wages and benefits for the 
clerical and technical workers who make a major but unap- 
preciated contribution to the program; (4) that elite universities do 
not adequately respect people who do not have academic creden- 
tials; and (5) that justice demands that those who do the routine 
and technical work of such an institution be given a greater share 
of its income. These are messages directed to the basic organiza- 
tion of society. Their political content seems obvious and was ap- 
parent to all of us who experienced the strike. 
When one argues that certain groups are entitled to greater 
economic benefits because they have been discriminated against in 
the past, the line between economic and political claims becomes 
meaningless. Otherwise the actions of the NAACP that were in- 
volved in Claiborne Hardware would have to be classified as eco- 
nomic. If there is a difference between the first amendment rights 
of HERE and of the NAACP, it is because the Court chooses to 
view labor relations as a special (and weaker) case for first amend- 
ment purposes. 
The suggestion that labor relations is an area in which the ex- 
change of ideas is not valuable enough to justify the risks seems to 
be based on a vision of working people as easily cowed, overly emo- 
tional, and likely to respond without thought to both union and 
employer solicitations. This vision, often found in law but rarely 
substantiated by reality, demeans and patronizes workers. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to measure the extent to which union organizing 
has been negatively affected by the labor movement's willingness 
to blame its defeats upon employer coercion. In my discussions 
with union organizers before and after particular elections and in 
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discussing the issue of organizing enerally with union officials, I 
have been struck by how often they attribute their failures to this 
cause. Attempting to deal with employer coercion has diverted en- 
ergy and attention which might better have been directed to a 
more realistic appraisal of union losses and to the development of 
techniques to overcome them. 
Vincent Sirabella recently stated at a conference that 
repetitive opinions have been offered for this dramatic deteri- 
oration in our ability to organize the unorganized. Generally 
the opinions focus on the employer bias of the NLRB, the 
anti-union ational administration, the surge of union-busting 
consultants, [and] the need for labor law reform . . . . I sub- 
mit that these rationales are at best, peripheral causes for our 
increasing stagnation. . . . We are confronted with this giant 
puzzle because the labor movement permitted a generation of 
time to elapse, approximately (1955-1980), without preparing, 
by education and training, for this current generation of 
organizers.98 
The concern with coercion has also led unions to adopt self- 
defeating organizing tactics. For example, unions concerned about 
coercion are apt to keep their campaigns ecret for too long and to 
avoid asking all but their most vocal supporters to identify them- 
selves as members. This prevents the type of dynamic that can oc- 
cur when, as happened at Yale, more and more people come to the 
fore. At one point in the Yale election campaign, for example, the 
union printed a poster that resembled the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence and included the signatures of hundreds of union support- 
ers. Many of the employees have since reported to me how exhila- 
rating an experience it was to see their names and that of so many 
of their co-workers publicly listed together on such a document. 
In his talk on union organizing Sirabella also compared the 
typical union organizer to "a boxer who telegraphs every punch."99 
He argued that the way to fight union-busting consultants was to 
"develop strategies which are unpredictable and unorthodox.'"100 
Pointing out that in the past many unions had organized without 
any legal protection, he concluded that "labor law reform would be 
meaningless to any union that failed to restructure its methods of 
organizing with careful recruitment of organizers, [and] first class 
98 V. Sirabella, supra note 3, at 3. 
99 Id. at 8. 
loo Id. 
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training. "101 
Sirabella is aware that talented and committed people are 
available both inside and outside the ranks of organized labor. He 
has recruited and trained the likes of John Wilhelm,102 Karl 
Lechow,103 and Andrea Ross.104 The impact has been dramatic and 
positive. It need not remain an isolated success amidst general fail- 
ure. If the labor movement will seek out, train, and support the 
best people available to it, it will be able to organize successfully 
despite the Board and the courts. If it does not it will continue to 
dwindle. 
'?' Id. at 10. 
102 John Wilhelm is currently Business Agent for Local 34 and New England Vice Pres- 
ident of HERE. He has become a nationally recognized labor leader. He comes from a prom- 
inent Virginia family. He is a Yale graduate whom Vinnie recruited through an advertise- 
ment in the New Haven paper seeking someone "willing to work long hours for low pay" to 
learn to be a labor leader. 
103 Karl Lechow is a college graduate who comes from an immigrant family of commit- 
ted radicals and union organizers. He is currently Deputy Director of Organizing for HERE. 
He is a fiery, class-conscious organizer whom both John and Vinnie describe as the best in 
the union. 
104 Andrea Ross comes from South Africa. She first realized the potential of unions to 
break through barriers of class and race when she worked as a secretary for a labor institute 
there. She worked as a clerical employee at Yale until she was brought o the fore during the 
Yale organizing drive. She served on the organizing and negotiating committees. She is cur- 
rently on the professional staff of Local 34. 
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